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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David J. Arthur appeals from the district court's orders revoking Arthur's
probation and denying his subsequently filed Rule 35 motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On September 18, 2008, police arrested Arthur on suspicion of driving under the
influence. (R., pp.9-10.) As this was Arthur's third driving under the influence, with prior
convictions in 2001 and 2007, respectively, the State charged Arthur with felony driving
under the influence. (R., pp.28-31.) Arthur and prosecutors negotiated a binding Rule
11 plea agreement in which Arthur would be placed "on supervised probation for a
period of four years," in exchange for Arthur's pleading guilty, completing various
evaluations and treatment programs, and serving 100 days in jail. (R., pp.49-51.) As
part of his plea agreement, Arthur also "expressly waive[d] any appeals that may
lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 and any appeal of Post Conviction Relief." (Id.)
Before sentencing, the district court expressed some concerns with the plea
agreement, and told the parties what amendments were necessary before the court
would accept the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, including 360 total days of jail time.
(5/28/2009 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-23; p.5, Ls.10-21.) The parties accepted the district court's
modifications and requested that the district court follow the Rule 11 plea agreement as
amended. (5/28/2009 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.5.) Consistent with the parties' binding
plea agreement, the district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Arthur
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to a unified term of ten years with five years fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed
Arthur on four years of supervised probation. (R., pp.61-71.)
On June 25, 2010, Arthur was charged with violating his probation by consuming
alcohol and changing his residence without first receiving his probation officer's
permission. (R., pp.76-81.} In exchange for Arthur's admitting the charge of consuming
alcohol, the State dismissed the charge for changing his residence, and the parties
recommended that Arthur be continued on probation with the additional condition that
he participate in the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program. (7/23/2010 Tr.,
p.2, Ls.6-13; p.4, L.5 - p.5, L.3; 8/30/2010 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20, L.13.} Consistent with
the parties' agreement, the district court reinstated Arthur on probation with the new
condition that he successfully participate and complete the New Life Program.

(R.,

p.93.) The district court also made clear that this was Arthur's last chance to succeed
on probation. (8/30/2010 Tr., p.25, L.1 - p.26, L.2.)
Three weeks later, Arthur again violated his probation agreement when he was
terminated from the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program and received a
related charge. (R., pp.100-06.) Pursuant to another agreement, Arthur admitted the
termination, the State dismissed the related charge, and the parties requested a Rider.
(10/13/2010 Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.5; p.6, L. 5 - p.7, L.18; 11/22/2010 Tr., p.29, Ls.1724; p.36, Ls.10-13.)

This time, however, the district court rejected the parties'

recommendation, noting that Arthur had already received a Rider and finding that
probation was not achieving the goal of rehabilitation.

(11/22/2010 Tr., p.38, L.17 -

p.42, L.2.) The district court revoked Arthur's probation. (R., pp.120-21.)
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Arthur filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his underlying sentence. (R.,
pp.115-19.) The district court denied Arthur's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.129-31.) Arthur
filed an appeal timely from the revocation of probation. (R., pp.122-24.)
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ISSUES
Arthur states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the district court's disposition
of his probation revocation proceedings and subsequent timely filed Rule
35 motion waived by Mr. Arthur's original plea agreement?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Arthur's probation without first considering whether this violation was
willful and whether alternative means would be adequate to address the
violation?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Arthur's
timely Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence following the
revocation of his probation because the district court failed to recognize its
discretion to entertain the merits of this motion?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The State rephrases the issues as:
1.
Does Arthur's negotiated, binding Rule 11 plea agreement unambiguously waive
all lawfully waivable appeals and expressly waive "any appeal pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35," thus barring the appeal of Arthur's probation revocation and
subsequently filed Rule 35 motion?
2.
If Arthur is not barred from appealing the probation revocation, has Arthur failed
to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in revoking probation?
3.
If Arthur is not barred from appealing the denial of his Rule 35 motion, has Arthur
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in denying that motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Arthur's Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement Unambiguously Waived All Appellate Rights
That Were Lawfully Waivable, Including An Appeal From His Probation's Revocation
And Especially From The Denial Of A Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
Arthur contends that "the prospective waiver of his appellate rights" in the original

plea agreement "did not encompass a right to appeal from subsequent probation
revocation proceedings," asserting that the agreement is ambiguous. (Appellant's brief,
pp.6-8.)

Arthur's argument fails because the term of the plea agreement is an

unambiguous prospective waiver of all appellate rights that "expressly waives any
appeals that may lawfully be waived." (R., p.51.) Arthur's appeal should therefore be
dismissed as non-justiciable and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Even if an ambiguity could be read into the plea agreement's term prospectively waiving
all appellate rights, there is certainly no ambiguity as far as that waiver relates to an
appeal pursuant to a Rule 35 motion; Arthur's appeal as it relates to that issue should
therefore be dismissed and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Interpretation of a plea agreement is governed by contract law standards. State

v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995); State v. Holdaway. 130 Idaho 482,
484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law reviewed de nova. State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 785, 918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct.
App. 1996).

The interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea

agreement are matters of law reviewed de nova. State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234,
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985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999).

However, the interpretation of ambiguous language in an

agreement presents a question of fact.

!sL

"Such interpretations require a trier of fact to

discern the intent of the contracting parties, generally by considering the objective and
purpose of the provision and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
agreement." State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

The Negotiated Plea Agreement Unambiguously Waived
Appellate Rights That Could Lawfully Be Waived

All

Prospective

On March 17, 2009, Arthur and prosecutors negotiated a binding Rule 11 plea
agreement. One of the terms of that binding plea agreement was as follows:
As part of the plea agreement, Defendant hereby expressly waives any
appeals that may lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any
appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and any appeal for Post
Conviction Relief.
(R., p.51.) That term of the plea agreement provided an unambiguous waiver of all of
Arthur's lawfully waivable prospective appellate rights. Arthur therefore has no right to
appeal from the district court's revocation of probation and this issue is not justiciable.
Arthur's appeal should be dismissed in its entirety and the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
Even if the plea agreement's term waiving all prospective appeals could be
construed as ambiguous regarding the revocation of probation,

it is certainly

unambiguous in its prospective waiver of any appeals arising from a Rule 35 motion.
On its face, the term explicitly waives "any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35."
(R., p.51.) Arthur has therefore waived his right to appeal from the district court's denial
of his Rule 35 motion. Even if Arthur's appeal is not dismissed in its entirety, it should
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be as it pertains to that issue, because Arthur has shown no ambiguity in the waiver of
any appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion.

11.
Even If Arthur Could Appeal From His Probation's Revocation, Arthur Has Still Failed To
Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Revoking Probation

A

Introduction
Despite unambiguously waiving all prospective appellate rights "that may lawfully

be waived" (R., p.51 ), Arthur nonetheless appeals from the revocation of his probation,
asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and
executed his previously imposed sentence of ten years with five years fixed, after Arthur
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his probation multiple times.
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) Even if Arthur could appeal from his probation's revocation,
Arthur has still failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." I.C. § 19-2601(4).

The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P .3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Revoked Arthur's Probation
In reviewing a district court's decision to revoke probation, this Court employs a

two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First,
the Court considers whether the defendant actually violated his probation.
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~

"If it is

determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation."

&

A district court's

decision to revoke probation is a discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of that discretion.

&

None of Arthur's arguments establish an abuse

of the district court's discretion in this case.
Arthur was not a model probationer. Arthur was placed on probation on June 9,
2009. (R., pp.61-63.) Consistent with his binding plea agreement, Arthur was ordered
to serve 360 days in jail. (R., p.60.) At least 180 of those days were served in custody,
with the remaining days requiring consistent monitoring through the Day Reporting
Program for at least 90 days and then the work-release program. (Id.) Within a few
weeks of completing that heavily supervised portion of his probation, Arthur violated his
probation by consuming alcohol on June 18, and June 20, 2010, and by changing his
residence without getting written permission from his probation officer. (R., pp.78-80.)
The two violations were related. Arthur began his probation living with his mother
and sister. (R., p.79.) Their landlord, after discovering Arthur's sex offender registration
requirements, ordered him to move out.

(Id.)

Arthur moved in with his aunt.

(Id.)

However, when Arthur came home drunk on June 18, 2010, his aunt kicked him out of
her house. (Id.) So, with nowhere else to go, Arthur moved back in with his mother.
(Id.) But Arthur could not stay with his mother, because the landlord would evict his
mother and sister. (Id.)
Needing a place to stay to remain on probation, and on the recommendation of
his probation officer, Arthur decided to look into the Lighthouse Rescue Mission.
(8/30/2010 Tr., p.22, Ls.17-24.) At the first probation revocation hearing, after Arthur
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had admitted the first violation and the State had dismissed the second, the parties
jointly recommended that Arthur be reinstated on probation, with the new condition that
he complete the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program with no additional
violations. (8/30/2010 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20, L.4.)
The district court accepted the parties' recommendation and gave Arthur another
chance to succeed on probation, reinstating him with that new condition. (8/30/2010
Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9.) In doing so, it also issued a strong warning, stating:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Arthur, I'm going to make you a deal. I'm
going to go ahead and find that you violated probation, give you credit for
seventy days that you served, place you back out on probation with the
requirement that you live at the Lighthouse, complete their programs, not
change residence obviously without permission of your P.O. All of the
other terms and conditions will be in effect. When you come back in here,
don't ask me again, because you're gone. You got it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT:
probation?

Do you recall all the terms and conditions of your

THE DEFENDANT: I do, ma'am.
THE COURT: And what's going to happen if you violate?
THE DEFENDANT: I will go to prison.
THE COURT: And do you remember your sentence?
THE DEFENDANT: Five years fixed.
THE COURT: Plus five. Okay ...
(8/30/2010 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-21.) Within three weeks of being placed at the Lighthouse
Rescue Mission, Arthur violated his probation again by getting terminated from the New
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Life Program on September 21, 2010.
Ls.3-4.)

(R., p.102; 10/13/2010 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-14; p.8,

As promised, the district court revoked Arthur's probation and imposed his

original sentence. (11/22/2010 Tr., p.41, L.7 - p.42, L.9.)
Arthur does not dispute that he was terminated from the New Life Program and
so violated that condition of his probation.

Rather, Arthur argues that his several

violations of the New Life Program's rules were not willful, and so the district court's
revocation of his probation was inappropriate.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.)

The

repeated rule violations which eventually led to Arthur's termination from the New Life
Program included verbally intimidating other program members, violating the blackout
policy by trying to call his ex-girlfriend both from the mission and from Terry Reilly
Health Services, voicing objections to the religious aspects of the program, and
passively refusing to take a drug test by not urinating in the sample cup. (R., p.102.) All
of these actions were within Arthur's control.
Arthur asserts that he failed to produce a urine sample for testing because he
suffers from a shy bladder, making it difficult for him to give a urine sample on demand.
(Appellant's brief, p.10.)

This argument ignores the fact that Arthur was given his

sample cup at 5:30 am. (R., p.103.) By noon, he had still failed to place a urine sample
in his cup for testing. (Id.) However, Arthur admitted to his probation officer that he had
urinated multiple times that morning.

(Id.)

Even if Arthur's allegedly "shy bladder"

makes it difficult for him to urinate on command, that hardly excuses his failure to place
a sample in the cup when he is already urinating. (Id.) As his case manager at the
rescue mission noted, "[s]ince [Arthur] admitted to using the bathroom several times
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during the morning without having taken his UA, it clearly indicates a refusal to test on
his part, and not simply any problem with not being able to urinate." (Id.)
Arthur also contends that his violations for "verbally intimidating other program
members" and "voicing objections to the religious aspects of the program" (R., p.103)
stemmed from his "standing up for his ethnic and religious heritage," and were not willful
violations. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) Assuming that these two violations are interrelated
as Arthur suggests, they do not show a lack of willful conduct on his part. Arthur asked
to be placed in the New Life Program because of its religious aspects, not in spite of
them. (See 8/30/2010 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-8; p.24, Ls.22-25.) And, while "standing up" for
one's heritage may be commendable, verbally intimidating others is not.
On appeal, Arthur does not address his violations of his "blackout period" by at
least twice attempting to call his ex-girlfriend.

Below, Arthur argued that he had

permission to call his mother, and so that was not a violation of the New Life Program's
rules. (11/22/2010 Tr., p.37, Ls.13-22.) Even assuming Arthur had permission to call
his mother, his argument still failed to recognize that he was not violated for calling his
mother; he was violated for attempting to call his ex-girlfriend.

(R., p.102.)

Again,

Arthur had control over whether or not he attempted to call his ex-girlfriend.
Arthur's probation was revoked because, in violation of that probation, he was
terminated from the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program. (11/22/2010 Tr.,
p.41, Ls.7-12.)

Arthur was terminated from the New Life Program because of his

repeated offenses and rules violations, which included verbally intimidating other
program members, calling his ex-girlfriend during his blackout period, voicing objections
to the religious aspects of the program, and refusing to give a urine sample.
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(R.,

pp.102-03.) None of these actions were beyond Arthur's control. Arthur has failed to
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in revoking his probation.

The

judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

111.
Even If Arthur Could Appeal From The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion, Arthur Has Still
Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying The Motion
Despite unambiguously waiving "any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35"
(R., p.51), Arthur nonetheless appeals from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, asserting
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion (appellant's brief,
pp.12-15). Even if Arthur could appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, he has still
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, the district "court may ... reduce a sentence upon
revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of
the order revoking probation." I.C.R. 35(b). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards
governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).

Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an

appellant to "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Arthur failed to satisfy
this burden.
Arthur failed to provide any new or additional information to the district court in
support of his Rule 35 motion. Quite to the contrary, through his counsel in his request
for leniency, Arthur asked that the "Honorable Court further consider the information
12

provided at Sentencing and contained in the Pre Sentence [sic] Investigation to
reconsider the sentence originally imposed." (R., pp.115-16.) Arthur also filed a direct
request for leniency, arguing again that his "shy bladder is a real condition" and that his
mother and sister were ill. (R., p.118.) The district court was already familiar with the
presentence report, was present at sentencing, and had heard Arthur's arguments
regarding his shy bladder and ill family members at the probation revocation hearing.
None of that information was new.
When considering a sentence imposed through a binding Rule 11 agreement, a
Rule 35 motion is frivolous if the defendant fails to show that his sentence is excessive
in view of additional information presented with the motion for reduction. See State v.
Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 526, 873 P.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1994). Absent the presentation
of new or additional information, Arthur has failed to establish an abuse of the district
court's discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

The district court correctly denied

Arthur's Rule 35 motion and its sentence should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
revoking Arthur's probation, and the district court's subsequent order denying Arthur's
Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of December 2011, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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